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The title of my panel at the conference from which this paper 
derives was ―The Future of Global Legal Regulation.‖ But neither I 
nor anyone else can predict a future that will be created by human 
beings and subject to the unpredictable effects of fortuna, as we 
would say if we were living in Renaissance Italy. The future, 
including the global legal future, will be also (in part) created by us, 
our children, and their children. I do not propose to predict the new 
things that will be created in the future. It would be depressing if we 
could do that. Let us attempt instead to talk about ongoing projects of 
human creative power, especially big, complex, and attractive 
projects, really worthy of our support, our loyalties, and our 
sacrifices. 
One such project is the project of global law, which is nothing 
more than the project of law understood in an ambitious way. Law is 
one of the great projects of human creative power, and hence one of 
the great projects of human civilization. Law can be seen as an 
established practice, or it can be seen as a project. To see it as a 
project is to attempt to understand it in a manner of a co-creator, not 
simply a user or a spectator. 
Perhaps surprisingly, this way of looking at law is not 
 
 †  Associate Professor, Department of Government and Politics, University of 
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commonplace. But it was one of the distinctive features of Lon 
Fuller’s legal theory,1 and (being an immense fan of Fuller) this is 
where I would like to start. Law for Fuller is the enterprise of 
subjecting human conduct to the governance of rules.2 Law is an 
enterprise, a project. Thus far I go with Fuller. But it is a more 
complex enterprise, related to its context in more interesting ways. It 
can and should be presented in its biggest and most attractive form. 
The purpose of law, then, is not to subject human conduct to the 
governance of rules. And it is not to establish or promote the rule of 
law or to establish justice. It is, I would say, to articulate the impartial 
and attractive principles of a complex, moderate, and universal 
civilization. That civilization will be the fruit and manifestation of 
human creative power. It will be engaged in a battle against human 
destructive capacity. The purpose of law is to articulate those 
principles in a manner that is usable by both courts and the allies of 
courts in this struggle. 
I sketch in this paper a view of law as an ambitious project, part of 
an even larger political and cultural project, whose culmination is a 
global constitution that forms the legal basis for a universal, complex, 
and modern civilization. The paper cannot stand on its own, for it is 
part of a larger effort to articulate a theory of civic moderation.3 But I 
will try to make it stand on its own as much as possible. 
There are both intellectual and practical advantages of looking at 
law as a project, an ambitious project, and as part of an even larger 
political and cultural project. The practical advantage is that it can 
 
1. See generally LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (rev. ed. 1969); 
WILLEM WITTEVEEN & WIBREN VAN DER BURG, REDISCOVERING FULLER (1999). 
2. FULLER, supra note 1, at 106.  
3. For more on my efforts to develop an ambitious conception of moderation, 
see Karol Edward Sołtan, Constitution Making at the Edges of Constitutional 
Order, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1409 (2007); Karol Edward Sołtan, Constitutional 
Patriotism and Militant Moderation, 6 INT’L J. CONST. L. 96, 99–101 (2008); Karol 
Edward Sołtan, Mature Democracy and Global Solidarity, in GLOBAL DEMOCRACY 
AND ITS DIFFICULTIES 17, 17–34 (Anthony Langlois & Karol Edward Sołtan eds., 
2009). This conception of moderation is my contribution to the effort to develop an 
intellectual community committed to ―civic studies.‖ For my earlier effort to 
identify what we eventually called civic studies, see Karol Edward Sołtan, Selznick 
and Civics, in LEGALITY AND COMMUNITY 357, 357–72 (Robert Kagan et al. eds., 
2002). This idea is a continuation and elaboration of the project of new 
constitutionalism. See generally A NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM: DESIGNING 
POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS FOR A GOOD SOCIETY (Stephen Elkin & Karol Edward 
Sołtan eds., 1993). 
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and should help us contribute to the project. The intellectual 
advantage is that it gives our understanding of law a distinctive form 
of generality and depth, consistent with an overall view of human 
beings as creators, not playthings of causal forces, and hence as 
engaged in multiple small and large projects. Arguably, each action is 
a small project, and so are the project of a global constitution and the 
most inclusive project of all, the project of universal civilization, a 
vast mosaic of projects and of products of those projects. 
A project, Wikipedia tells us (and no more sophisticated source is 
needed here), is a ―temporary endeavor undertaken to create a unique 
product, service or result.‖4 Alternatively, according to that other 
global authority, the Wiktionary, it is ―a planned endeavor, usually 
with a specific goal and accomplished in several steps or stages.‖5 We 
can think of it as the basic element of the work of human creative 
power. It is what human creation on the large scale is divided into. 
To see law as a project is to see it as movement along a path. The 
current state of the law is just a time slice, and not necessarily a 
coherent one. It contains elements of the past and of the starting 
point. But it contains also elements of various imaginable, more or 
less attractive, futures. Its legitimacy depends less on its 
contemporary coherence than on the capacity it exhibits to move 
toward some attractive end.  
Some clarification is needed. We would be well served by 
distinguishing three kinds of accounts of the law. The first type are 
accounts of law meant for judges and constrained by what judges 
properly do. This differs in detail between legal systems and styles of 
judging. But courts resolve disputes and in general are reluctant to go 
beyond what is necessary to resolve those disputes. Moreover, judges 
are supposed to be constrained by the text of the law, when there is 
such a text, authoritatively determined outside the courts. One is 
tempted to say this is an account of law as it is. But that is 
misleading, without a long discussion of Dworkin.6 In any case, it is 
an account in which interpretation and dispute resolution are crucial. 
 
4. Wikipedia, Project, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Project (last visited Apr. 7, 
2010). 
5. Wiktionary, Project, http://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/Project (last visited Apr. 7, 
2010). 
6. For the most elaborate account, see RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 
(1986). For a good overview in an introductory text, see ANDREW ALTMAN, 
ARGUING ABOUT LAW (2d ed. 2001).  
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The second account of law consists of a normative theory of what 
law ought to be. This is really not an account of law but more nearly 
a political philosophy: utilitarianism and Rawls’s theory of justice 
would be among the most familiar examples.7 It need pay no attention 
to what judges do or to the current (or the past) practice of law. 
In between these two is the third type of account, an account of law 
as a project. It is given a rough sketch in the last chapter of 
Dworkin’s Law’s Empire.8 But it is marginal in Dworkin’s theory, 
which is centrally an account of law for the judges. 
Tushnet has famously argued that we should take seriously the 
Constitution outside the courts (the U.S. Constitution, in his case).9
 
This is to see the Constitution as a project. Indeed, Tushnet suggests a 
thin account of the Constitution to serve as the centerpiece of this 
project. It is ―a law oriented to realizing the principles of the 
Declaration of Independence and the Constitution’s Preamble. More 
specifically it is a law committed to the principle of human rights 
justifiable by reason in the service of self-government.‖10  
We can generalize the idea, and work to develop a thin account of 
the global constitution to put at the center of the project of law, 
understood as something to be pursued in courts but also outside 
courts. To be pursued by whom and how? Tushnet suggests the 
responsibility for law be distributed broadly among the people and 
adopts for himself the populist label.11 It is more in line with the 
project of law and the project of a global constitution (as well as the 
U.S. Constitution) to be more institutionally specific. The most 
 
7. For a good overview of utilitarianism, see generally WILL KYMLICKA, 
CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 9–49 (1990). The most prominent 
contemporary utilitarian is Peter Singer. See PETER SINGER, PRACTICAL ETHICS 
(1979). For further reading on Rawls’ main works, see JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF 
JUSTICE (Harvard University Press 1972) (1971) [hereinafter RAWLS, A THEORY OF 
JUSTICE]; JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1996) [hereinafter RAWLS, 
POLITICAL LIBERALISM]. For a later restatement, see JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS 
FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT (2001) [hereinafter, RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS].   
8. DWORKIN, supra note 6, at 400–13. 
9. See generally MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE 
COURTS (1999). 
10. Id. at 181. 
11. TUSHNET, supra note 9. For further discussion of the populist nature of 
Tushnet’s work, see generally Mark Graber, The Law Professor as Populist, 34 U. 
RICH. L. REV. 373 (2000); Mark Graber, Thick and Thin: Interdisciplinary 
Conversations on Populism, Law, Political Science, and Constitutional Change, 90 
GEO. L.J. 233 (2001).  
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promising institutional instrument for the development of this project 
are self-limiting, organized social movements in the style of Gandhi, 
Martin Luther King, and many others. These are movements 
committed to principle, rational deliberation, experimentalism, and 
nonviolence (the People are not always and everywhere so 
committed). Like courts, they are instruments of a form of ambitious 
moderation on which I elaborate below. 
II. INSTITUTIONAL INSTRUMENTS 
The project of the emerging global constitution is certainly a big 
project. It is part of an even larger project of creating a universal 
complex civilization. This is work with a long history and for the 
long term. It is said that people routinely overestimate how much the 
world can change in 5 years and routinely underestimate how much it 
can change in 50 or 100 years (think how the world appeared in 1910 
or even in 1960). So if the project of a global constitution seems 
unrealistic, that may be simply because you are thinking short term.  
Nonetheless, to make the project as realistic as possible, we need 
more institutional instruments beyond the ones we have at hand. 
Sovereign territorial states, especially the most powerful ones, will 
resist. International organizations, established and controlled (to a 
large degree) by states, are not likely to be reliable instruments. 
But on the political horizon we can see something else. We can see 
more than the chaos of initiatives from the bottom up, the global civil 
society, or the global civic society as it should be called, since it is 
the domain of multiple civic initiatives, each a potential embodiment 
of the civic ideal. Domestic precedents suggest a more coordinated 
institution could emerge from this chaos: a union (more than a 
network, less than a federation) of self-limiting social movements 
(human rights, environmental, civic renewal) pursuing their goals in a 
Gandhian style. 
If we are to be politically realistic about the global project of law, 
with global constitutional law at its core, we should take as its 
instrument not courts alone but an alliance of courts, constitutional 
states, and self-limiting social movements, so the principles of the 
global constitution must be formulated to be usable by courts, 
officials of constitutional states, and self-limiting social movements. 
Courts alone do not get very far with the moderate project and the 
project of law. Only courts embedded in a broader institutional 
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context (an alliance of institutions if you like) and embedded in an 
intellectual context (a helpful understanding of law and moderation, 
and a helpful disciplinary reorganization of the modern culture) can 
take us much further. 
An alliance with constitutional states is for courts old news. And it 
is obviously problematic for the project of the law of the global 
constitution. In that part of the project, states, even constitutional 
states, play mostly (though not exclusively) the role of Madisonian 
factions, each protecting and promoting its narrow interests above all, 
little concerned with the global common good, or with universal 
principles codified in law. 
There must be more: some form of organized pressure from below, 
some moderate equivalent of the revolutionary party of the Leninist 
type. Nothing exists at the moment that fits the bill, certainly not the 
open networks of organizations that go under the collective label of 
global civic society (actually global civil society, but that is simply a 
misnomer). But here too we have seen enough precedent, both 
domestic and global, to be able to identify what could be a promising 
instrument if it were created: a global union of self-limiting social 
movements committed to impartial principle and taking human 
destructiveness as the enemy. Gandhi is for them an exemplar. To be 
substantively specific, the cause of moderation and hence of the 
global constitution would be best served by a global union of three 
kinds of social movements: movements for human rights, 
environmental movements, and movements for civic renewal. I like 
to call such a potential organization Global Solidarity. 
III. LAW AS A PROJECT 
Thus, the project of a global constitution and its law will be best 
served by an alliance of courts, constitutional states, and a future 
Global Solidarity. And the principles of a global constitution must be 
usable by all three. They must have a legal expression to be usable by 
courts. They must be usable by states outside courts and by 
international organizations that are the products of states. But the 
novel component is the third: they must also be usable in self-limiting 
social movements. 
The idea of law as a project is both familiar and obscure. It seems 
both central to the practice of law and somehow external to it. It is 
expressed in often-repeated phrases. In the common law tradition, 
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nothing beats the words of Lord Mansfield: ―The common law that 
works itself pure by rules drawn from the fountain of justice, is for 
that reason superior to an act of parliament.‖12 The claim of 
superiority of common law to acts of parliament is now best 
forgotten, but of common law Fuller still says: ―The common law 
works itself pure and adapts itself to the needs of the new day.‖13  
Ronald Dworkin opens his article Law’s Ambitions for Itself with 
three formulations of the idea.14 In addition to ―[l]aw works itself 
pure,‖ he writes, ―[t]here is a higher law, within and yet beyond 
positive law, toward which positive law grows‖ and ―[l]aw has its 
own ambition.‖15 These are mostly slogans aiming for a striking 
phrase and a memorable metaphor. But the idea is widespread and 
important, and it can be expressed more prosaically as Fuller does 
when he tells us that law is ―the enterprise of subjecting human 
conduct to the governance of rules.‖16 Similarly, Selznick has 
identified the reduction of arbitrariness as the ideal of law.17  
Law, one might say, is the project of building a community of 
principle (Dworkin),18 a project of creating a world subject to public 
reason (Kumm),19 or a project of the reduction of arbitrariness and the 
expansion of the sphere of decision making constrained by the 
impartial justification. But to stop there is to fail both to identify the 
distinctive qualities of law and to articulate some of the important 
ways in which law is worthy of our loyalties and sacrifices. 
Law is not simply a project of subjecting human conduct to the 
governance of rules. It is, if anything, a project that involves 
balancing rules and principles. More generally, the process of 
balancing multiple principles seems to be at the heart of law. If that is 
 
12. Omychard v. Barker, (1744) 26 Eng. Rep. 15, 23.  
13. LON L. FULLER, THE LAW IN QUEST OF ITSELF 140 (1940). See also 
FREDERICK SCHAUER, THINKING LIKE A LAWYER 105 (2009).  
14. Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Ambitions for Itself, 71 VA. L. REV. 173, 173–74 
(1985).  
15. Id. at 173. 
16. FULLER, supra note 1, at 106.  
17. See generally PHILIP SELZNICK, LAW, SOCIETY AND INDUSTRIAL JUSTICE 
(1969). For a more recent general presentation of Selznick’s views, see PHILIP 
SELZNICK, THE MORAL COMMONWEALTH (1992).  
18. DWORKIN, supra note 6, at 211, 213 14.  
19. See generally Mattias Kumm, The Cosmopolitan Turn in Constitutionalism, 
in RULING THE WORLD?: CONSTITUTIONALISM, INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND GLOBAL 
GOVERNANCE (Jeffrey Dunoff & Joel Trachtman eds., 2009).  
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true, then law cannot be seen as the application of one logically 
coherent theory. So law does not maximize wealth.20 And law is not 
fully captured, even in its most idealized form, by, say, a Rawlsian 
theory of justice21 or a Dworkinian principle of equality.22 Balancing 
and proportionality are at the heart of the rule of law,23 including 
balancing between principles and rules. 
But those who attempt to articulate what is distinctive about the 
practice and the project of law by simply specifying its goal 
(subjecting human conduct to the governance of rules) always seem 
to end up with a picture of law fundamentally at odds with widely 
perceived appearances. Somehow law is everywhere or almost 
everywhere. For Fuller, law is everywhere human conduct is 
subjected to rules, and that seems to take us a very large distance 
away from lawyers’ law, or law as it is practiced in courts. It seems 
more faithful to the inherited distinctions that govern our thinking 
about law to define the project of law in a way that includes both 
ends and means. For the project of law, courts are the central means. 
And it matters that courts are instruments for the resolving of 
conflicts; they are peace-making instruments. This suggests also a 
third element in the goals of law: opposition to the power and effect 
of human destructiveness.  
I would put it this way: to understand law, we need to articulate a 
larger moderate project, a form of moderation that is both 
intellectually and politically ambitious. When we do so, we will be 
able to see the project of law as serving moderation through courts. 
The project of law is, I suggest, part of a larger moderate project of 
institutional and political reform. Moderation (in the relevant sense) 
has three pillars. Commitment to impartial principle (public reason) 
 
20. See generally Richard Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics and Legal Theory, 
8 J. LEG. STUD. 103 (1979). For a recent overview, see generally KLAUS MATHIS, 
EFFICIENCY INSTEAD OF JUSTICE? (2009). 
21. See RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 7; RAWLS, POLITICAL 
LIBERALISM, supra note 7. For a later restatement, see RAWLS, JUSTICE AS 
FAIRNESS, supra note 7.  
22. See generally Ronald Dworkin, What is Equality? Part I: Equality of 
Welfare, 10 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 185 (1981); Ronald Dworkin, What is Equality? 
Part II: Equality of Resources, 10 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 283 (1981); Ronald Dworkin, 
What is Equality? Part III: The Place of Liberty, 73 IOWA L. REV. 1 (1987); Ronald 
Dworkin, What is Equality? Part IV: Political Equality, 22 U.S.F. L. REV. 1 
(1987).  
23. See DAVID BEATTY, THE ULTIMATE RULE OF LAW 159–88 (2004).  
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or reduction of arbitrariness (and hence a certain kind of impartial 
deliberation) is one of those pillars. The second is a commitment to 
pluralism and diversity, hence also to attractive and harmonious 
balances among principles. Harmonious balance, not coherence or 
integrity, is on this view the master virtue of law. Complexity and 
unity in diversity are among its attractive features. The third pillar of 
moderation is opposition to human destructiveness. So some of the 
principles we endorse guide improvement and creation, but others 
diminish the power and effect of destructiveness. Peace is an ideal of 
moderation, but so are freedom understood as diminishing the power 
of coercion and order understood as increasing the predictability in 
coercion. 
IV. MODERATION 
The project of moderation is not restricted to law. Law seems to 
me best seen as that part of the larger project which uses courts as 
instruments and hence elaborates rules and principles which courts 
can use in the service of moderation. When we speak of law as a 
system of rules and principles, we mean just that: these are rules and 
principles which courts can use in the service of the project of 
moderation, with its three pillars of commitment to public reason and 
impartial rationality, diversity and pluralism (pluralism of ideals, 
institutions, and creative projects), and a struggle against the power 
and effect of human destructiveness.  
These three pillars can be elaborated in multiple ways. Impartial 
rationality requires a commitment to the giving of impartial reasons 
for decisions and to the making of decisions based on impartial 
reasons. But beyond that, rationality requires error prevention (and 
hence various deliberative procedures) and error correction (and 
hence something like Popper’s open society).24 It requires also a 
social differentiation, a division of labor that Smithian economics 
emphasizes, and a broader differentiation and specialization of the 
normative structures, which we develop for the handling of different 
issues: rationality requires what we might call an embedded 
fragmentation of the institutions to handle the difficult problems, 
requiring complex institutions and complex skills. Embedded 
fragmentation of global law and global constitution is just one aspect 
 
24. See KARL POPPER, THE OPEN SOCIETY AND ITS ENEMIES (5th ed. 1966); 
RALF DAHRENDORF, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN EUROPE (Transaction 
2005) (1990). 
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of this broader feature of what rationality requires. 
The division of labor and differentiation that is both the featured 
characteristic of Smithian argument for markets as instruments of 
economic growth, and a featured characteristic of modernity 
according to many sociological accounts, is only one kind of division 
of labor. We might call it the division of labor into tasks. Rationality 
also supports division of labor into stages, with its characteristic 
requirement of the maintenance of continuity between stages in order 
to be able to create over time. This form of division of labor is best 
explained by citing a homely example familiar in an academic 
setting. When we write papers, we divide our task into stages we call 
drafts. Each draft is a draft of the whole paper (though it may be 
incomplete). Thus we distinguish two kinds of divisions of a creative 
project, such as a paper. We can separate a paper into parts and work 
on each part separately. But we also divide the writing into stages. 
The first draft of a paper, even if it is complete in that it includes all 
parts, will typically mark the end of only the initial stages of the 
work. There are likely to be many subsequent stages. This is not 
Dworkin’s weird chain novel written one chapter at a time25 but 
rather an all-but-universal pattern of large scale creation. We do not 
simply begin with the first chapter; we begin rather with some sketch 
of the whole, which we then fill in, usually (but not necessarily) 
starting at the beginning. And as we proceed we also keep modifying 
the overall plan. We work incrementally for the most part, although 
occasional breakthroughs can rearrange the whole project. But even 
then continuity must be maintained, unless of course we abandon the 
project completely. So what has already been created constrains the 
process of creation in the present.  
Impartial rationality as we see from the above discussion imposes a 
complex system of requirements. The second pillar of moderation, 
the requirement of pluralism, is also complex. We need to keep in 
mind at least three dimensions of pluralism. First, we insist on a 
pluralism of projects. Some of these are projects for individuals, in 
fact a project of self-creation, self-discovery, and self-cultivation for 
each individual in the world. Others are shared projects, local or 
universal, which are shared by a countless variety of cross-cutting 
and over-lapping groups. Each such project can be thought of as a 
little res publica within the boundaries of those who pursue it. 
 
25. DWORKIN, supra note 6, at 228–29. 
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In a world dominated by the utilitarian style of thought and its 
various aggregative cousins (such as cost-benefit analysis),26 it is 
worth emphasizing that not all of these shared projects are 
composites made up of smaller projects (in the way the utilitarian 
goal is composed of individual goals). And when a project is a 
composite, the elements need not be individual projects or 
preferences. The most encompassing project is therefore best seen not 
as the global pursuit of human welfare but rather as the development 
of a universal moderate civilization, understood as composed of all 
the projects of humanity consistent with moderation, and of their 
products. 
The second dimension of pluralism supports at any level and for 
any project a plurality of principles, ideals, or legitimate interests. 
This favors complex projects, aiming for various forms of 
harmonious balance.  
Finally, a third dimension of pluralism is one that supports contests 
among different projects and among different conceptions of the 
same project. Such contests are the best way to test the quality and 
attractiveness of projects. We moderates support contests in the 
economy (markets), contests in the polity (competitive elections), 
contests in the realm of ideas, and contests in countless other realms 
of human creative endeavor. Contests require a plurality of 
contestants, without which improvement is hard to sustain. 
Pluralism, like impartial rationality, imposes a complex system of 
requirements. The same can be said of the third and final pillar of 
moderation. The opposition to the power and effect of human 
destructiveness is also complex. There are different ways in which 
we try to defeat destruction. Three are familiar.27 Peace is an obvious 
way to defeat destruction and destructiveness. Order (what Hayek 
calls justice) and predictability (based on general rules) in state use of 
violence allow us to avoid the destructiveness of the state. This is at 
the heart of the classic form of Rechtsstaat and the importance of 
 
26. For two good introductions to cost benefit analysis, see ANTHONY 
BOARDMAN ET AL., COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS: CONCEPTS AND PRACTICE (2005); 
E.J. MISHAN & EUSTON QUAH, COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS (2005). For an excellent 
collection of critical discussions of cost benefit analysis, see generally Uri Gneezy 
& Aldo Rustichini, A Fine is a Price, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2000).  
27. Hayek writes of ―peace, freedom and justice: the three great negatives.‖ 
FRIEDRICH HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY 130 (1979). By justice, 
Hayek means something closer to order and predictability. Id.  
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general rules in law.28 And we achieve freedom, understood as the 
absence of coercion, to the extent we diminish the power of the 
instruments of destruction.  
If we are more aggressive in the war against destruction, we go 
beyond any of these ends. We attempt to reverse destruction. 
Renewal, rebirth, restoration, and renaissance are the most ambitious 
ways to defeat destruction, stronger and more far-reaching than 
peace, order, and freedom. 
We now understand also, as increasingly we must, that human 
destructiveness takes more forms than those traditionally recognized. 
The moderate project, opposed to destructiveness in an advanced 
industrial society, needs to recognize the destructiveness of human 
economic activity. A certain kind of environmental concern must 
become an integral element of our opposition to destructiveness. So 
the contemporary moderate project will be necessarily also an 
environmentalist project: it will see traditional constitutionalism and 
a certain form of environmentalism as part of the same task.  
The most ambitious goal of the struggle against destruction and 
destructiveness is to reverse it, to destroy the effects of destruction. In 
the post-Enlightenment age of the nineteenth century (certainly with 
echoes into the twentieth), this took the form of reactionary politics 
attempting to turn the clock back and return to the past. If we are 
engaged in a battle between creation and destruction, this is not an 
attractive proposition: it undoes the destruction as well as the 
improvements.  
The idea of a rebirth, or renewal or restoration, is more attractive. 
It is not an attempt to go back into the past but to restore greater 
continuity with the past. So when we restore an ecological system, an 
urban neighborhood, or a whole city (as my home town Warsaw was 
restored after World War II), you do not go back to the past. It is 
better to put it this way: your aim is create what might have 
developed (an ecosystem, a neighborhood, a city) if human 
destructiveness had not intervened so massively. We have a choice 
here: we are free to choose the most attractive form of what might 
have developed. The river is restored to what it might have become, 
and Old Town of Warsaw is restored to what it might have become as 
well. 
 
28. See generally FRIEDRICH HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY (1960).  
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V. UNDERSTANDING THE PROJECT OF LAW 
How should we best understand the project of law? It is not enough 
to understand it as the courts would understand it, though it is the 
business of a lawyer to understand it that way if she is to be 
successful. Why not? There is a simple answer: the project of law 
cannot be sustained without support from outside the courts, and it 
certainly cannot prosper without such support. We must consider the 
project of law outside the courts, in some ways parallel to Mark 
Tushnet’s populist constitutional law as a project of the U.S. 
Constitution (the thin constitution) outside the courts.29 
Judges’ understanding of law is in various ways restricted by the 
distinctive tasks of courts in the project of law. For judges the 
problem of motivation is diminished; they are paid to do what they 
do. But the project of law in general depends on the work of people 
whose incentives are not necessarily so well aligned with what will 
make the project prosper. Motivation is a crucial issue. 
Courts have a central but necessarily limited role in the project of 
law. The precise nature of those limits is controversial and variable. 
Its details differ in different legal systems and they evolve over time. 
But it is a central function of courts to resolve disputes, for example. 
If that is the business of the judge, then she needs an understanding of 
the project of law sufficient to resolve the conflict before her, but not 
more. Or to take another example, in broad areas of law there are 
authoritative legal texts, and it is not the business of the courts to 
change those texts. A judge needs to understand only the law as 
written. So the work of law is largely a certain form of interpretation. 
It is not the business of courts to change the text but to promote the 
law within the text (so to speak). 
Courts are the central institutional instrument of law as a project, 
so this understanding of law from the courts’ perspective is 
indispensable. But the project of law would never have gotten as far 
as it has, and it could never develop further, if it operated only within 
courts. A constitutional state with a balanced constitution, with both 
autonomous courts and an executive willing to enforce what the 
courts decide, obviously requires a larger political program, not just 
law within the courts. Law cannot exist except as it serves the courts 
and is served by them. But it would be nothing if it were limited to 
 
29. TUSHNET, supra note 9, at 181. 
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the courts. And a deeper development of the project of law on the 
global scale requires an even broader understanding of the project of 
law, just as it requires a broader range of institutional instruments. 
If it is not enough to understand law as the judges should, what 
then? There are no doubt many possibilities. I will pick from among 
them one that reflects a larger normative commitment to strengthen 
and improve human creative capacity. I will outline an understanding 
of the project of law that is as helpful as possible to the project of 
law. This effort is then part of a larger enterprise (a larger project, if 
you can tolerate so much word repetition) of helping projects and 
thus helping human creative capacity. 
Since this way of formulating my goal is bound to bring to mind 
Dworkin’s interpretive stance, with its slogan ―make it the best it can 
be,‖ let me explain it more fully by way of contrast with Dworkin. 
Dworkin contrasts two attitudes toward shared practices.30 We can 
treat those practices ―as taboos,‖ as governed by fixed rules that need 
only to be obeyed, no matter how arbitrary, not justified or 
interpreted. Or we can take an interpretive attitude, in which our 
fidelity to the practice involves also giving it the best possible 
interpretation. The latter attitude may then also cause us to obey more 
selectively and creatively in light of our interpretation of the practice. 
There is a third alternative suggested at the end of Dworkin’s 
Law’s Empire and in the various slogans I have presented above.31 
Law can be taken as a project. Fidelity to a project requires more than 
charitably interpreting a text or a text analogue. It requires 
participation in a continuing process of creation, in a way that is as 
helpful to that process as possible, which means preserving what is 
being created, improving it, and more generally, bringing it closer to 
completion. 
Interpreting a text requires attributing to it a meaning that makes it 
the best it can be. But the process of interpretation leaves the text 
unchanged and attaches no significance to sequence and history. Not 
so, if we consider law as a project. Nothing, then, about the law is to 
be treated as finished, though each change must preserve the 
continuity of the project. We experience law not as a judge 
experiences the text of the law but more like the judge experiences 
 
30. DWORKIN, supra note 6, at 47.  
31. See id. at 400–13. 
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the constraint of the law in common law and, more generally, the way 
you must experience any process of creation divided into stages and 
occurring over time: the later stages must build on earlier stages; 
creation now must be constrained by the process of creation that it 
has inherited. 
Interpretations of a text are to be evaluated on two dimensions: fit 
and value. Understanding a project is best evaluated also on those 
two dimensions but with two crucial modifications. We are not 
restricted to changes in meaning, though we are constrained by the 
requirements of continuity (hence the value of incrementalism and 
precedent). And the dimension of fit is sensitive to sequence and 
history. In identifying a project, we search for trends in history 
worthy of articulating and extending into the future. These are the 
projects we judge valuable. A project produces a trend, but the trend 
may be noticeable only when the project is articulated. And the trend 
is not inevitable: any project can be abandoned. Projects do not 
constitute historical laws identifying an inevitable future. Projects are 
simply distinct units of human creative power, extended over time, as 
they must be to overcome the sheer difficulty of creation on a large 
scale. 
To understand a project in a way faithful to it requires therefore a 
distinctive kind of historical analysis, an identification of trends, and 
an articulation of their possible extension into the future. The trends 
in question need not be linear, identifying a direction of progress and 
moving in that direction. Large-scale creation through projects works 
differently, as we see rather clearly when we look at creation in 
science. The relevant pattern in science was first noted by T. S. Kuhn, 
who described it as a sequence of periods of normal science and 
scientific revolutions.32 It has since been more adequately described 
by others.33 A scientific research program34 or a research tradition35 is 
a sequence of scientific theories. Each successive theory builds on the 
previous one. Each theory must be evaluated not in isolation but on 
the basis of its place in the sequence and the value of the sequence as 
a whole. A research program or tradition usually develops 
 
32. See T.S. KUHN, STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (2d ed. 1970). 
33. See, e.g., PETER GODFREY-SMITH, THEORY AND REALITY (2003). 
34. See generally IMRE LAKATOS, THE METHODOLOGY OF SCIENTIFIC 
RESEARCH PROGRAMMES (1978).  
35. See generally LARRY LAUDAN, PROGRESS AND ITS PROBLEMS: TOWARDS A 
THEORY OF SCIENTIFIC GROWTH (1978). 
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incrementally in what Kuhn has called ―normal science.‖36 But 
sometimes it undergoes a radical transformation (a scientific 
revolution), while maintaining a certain amount of continuity with the 
past: Newtonian mechanics, for example, is preserved as a special 
case of relativity theory.37 So, we have a kind of cycle: periods of 
deep creative transition alternating with periods of incremental 
growth, which tend to be more linear and predictable. 
Ideas about how to make a shared practice the best it can be are a 
part of what this understanding of a project requires, since a project is 
a process of continuing creation and improvement. But a helpful 
understanding of the project would also, for example, make it as 
realistic as possible. This is usually taken to mean: make it small. I 
think proper attention to the relevant problems of motivation suggests 
something close to the opposite tack: make it a big project that can be 
pursued in small steps. 
VI. THE PROBLEM OF MOTIVATION 
Large-scale human creative projects, as has been recognized in the 
case of politics since at least the Axial Age of the various 
civilizations, appear to have a choice. They can be organized in a 
thoroughly hierarchical way and extend in this way the creative 
power of the individual who is placed at the top of the hierarchy 
through some effectively organized system of incentives, of rewards 
and punishments. This is how the pyramids were built and how the 
Qin empire was created in ancient China under legalist influence. 
Alternatively (and this is the moderate alternative) they can 
proceed in a more decentralized way, but they then face what modern 
social science has called social dilemmas or problems of collective 
action.38 At the heart of the decentralized form of large-scale human 
creativity is then the problem of motivation. Markets provide one 
solution to this problem, but it is widely recognized that they are not 
a sufficient solution. The problem of motivation remains: how can we 
 
36. KUHN, supra note 32, at 2.  
37. See generally Kuhn, supra note 32. More precisely, Newtonian mechanics is 
reformulated, making it an approximation to a special case of the new relativity 
theory. Some people read into Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions radically 
irrational claims that deny even this limited continuity in scientific revolutions. But 
whatever Kuhn said or meant, this much continuity does exist.  
38. See MANCUR OLSON, LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (rev. ed. 1971); 
MICHAEL TAYLOR, THE POSSIBILITY OF COOPERATION (1987); ELINOR OSTROM, 
GOVERNING THE COMMONS (1990).  
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motivate large numbers of people to sacrifice their narrow interest for 
larger projects, even in settings where, if they do all sacrifice, they 
will all be better off? 
To generate motivation we should formulate the project in a way 
that appeals to both the heart and the mind, so that the project 
engages the passions as well as reason. Let me focus on one aspect of 
the problem most directly relevant to the project of the global 
constitution. 
A good way to begin the discussion is with the Parable of the Two 
Bricklayers. Those who are serious about promoting human creative 
power like to repeat this parable. I have encountered it in the writing 
of Harry Boyte, a key thinker in the contemporary American civic 
renewal movement, and in the writings of Mikhail Gorbachev.39  
Two bricklayers are working side by side building a wall. One 
thinks he is building just a wall. The second sees himself as building 
a cathedral. The second finds inspiration in his work and puts much 
creative energy into it. For the first it is just a damn job. 
The first bricklayer has an incompletely theorized approach to his 
work.40 He might be concerned that, while there appears to be an 
overlapping consensus41 on building a wall, others might have 
different comprehensive theories of the cathedral, or the bricklayer 
next to him might derive his commitment from the conviction that he 
is building a brothel. But big projects inspire and motivate, and the 
project of law badly needs inspiration. 
 
39. Boyte and Kari write that: 
―[p]ublic work‖ is work by ordinary people that builds and sustains our 
basic public goods and resources—what used to be called ―our 
commonwealth.‖ The story of the two bricklayers who were asked what 
they were doing conveys this sense. One said, ―building a wall.‖ The other 
said, ―building a cathedral.‖ 
HARRY C. BOYTE & NANCY N. KARI, BUILDING AMERICA: THE DEMOCRATIC 
PROMISE OF PUBLIC WORK 16 (1996). Gorbachev’s version is more elaborate: 
There is an old story: A traveler approached some people erecting a 
structure and asked one by one: ―What is it you’re doing?‖ One replied 
with irritation: ―Oh, look, from morning till night we carry these damn 
stones . . . .‖ Another rose from his knees, straightened his shoulders and 
said proudly: ―You see, it’s a temple we’re building!‖ So if you see this 
lofty goal—a shining temple on a green hill—then the heaviest of stones 
are light, the most exhausting work a pleasure. 
MIKHAIL GORBACHEV, PERESTROIKA 15–16 (rev. ed. 1987). 
40. Cf. CASS SUNSTEIN, DESIGNING DEMOCRACY 49–66 (2001).  
41. See RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 7. 
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Contemporary political and legal theories, to which I allude in the 
paragraph above, are preoccupied with the problem of disagreement 
and suppress the elaboration of encompassing projects, because it is 
difficult to agree on the nature of such projects. They do not seem to 
be concerned with the problem of motivation. But the world will not 
move unless and until people are motivated to move it. This exclusive 
preoccupation with disagreement is a recipe for the betrayal of human 
creative power. The problem of motivation is central, and it requires 
the elaboration of large and encompassing projects. Yes, there will be 
disagreements, but the bricklayers can build the wall, each with a 
cathedral in mind, even if each bricklayer’s cathedral is different and 
even if some think they are building a brothel. The bricklayers need 
not agree on exactly what kind of grand and awesome structure they 
are building; they need only sufficient overlapping consensus to 
actually build the wall. 
So the most helpful understanding of the project of law will 
include, so to speak, guidance on the building of walls, but it will also 
include a conception of the grand cathedral we are building. It will 
allow us to contribute in micro-detail to the project of law, and it will 
also allow us to see each small detail as part of some immense and 
comprehensive project. 
We will disagree with others about the nature of that project, but 
we can agree on the details. And we can support each other as part of 
the solidarity that connects builders of cathedrals (even different 
cathedrals) as against those who only care about walls.  
It appears that people have a powerful inclination toward 
selfishness and short-sightedness. And human organizations do as 
well. I believe we should give an account of the project of law that is 
maximally helpful in diminishing this motivational problem. Hence, 
among other things, we should present the project of law as part of 
building a cathedral (or a very impressive brothel, if you prefer) and 
not a wall. 
VII. NEW MEDIEVALISM 
What then is the big project that encompasses global law? Here is 
the somewhat simple version of the answer I would propose. The 
larger project is the creation of a complex and moderate universal 
civilization, a universal civilization composed of less universal 
civilizations, cultures, and multiple projects of human creative power, 
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a world of human creation that is both diverse and unified. And 
global law articulates those impartial and attractive principles of a 
complex and universal civilization that are usable by the courts. This 
is a big project, the most encompassing project of human creative 
power. And it is a project with a long and dramatic history, with a 
number of parallel civilizational paths (China, India, Islam, the West) 
and dramatic crises and renaissances restoring continuity with the 
past. 
This immense project was in the past associated with the projects 
of universal empire, empires aspiring to govern the entire civilized 
world, as it then appeared, such as the Han empire of China or the 
Roman empire. In the West, this project was revived in medieval 
Europe by a dual system of Holy Roman Empire and Papacy, both 
aspiring to civilizational universality. The project collapsed with the 
religious divisions of Christendom and the political divisions 
characteristic of the Westphalian system of sovereign territorial 
states. But there are signs of its renaissance. Observing those signs, 
many now talk of a ―new medievalism.‖  
Scholars in international relations,42 international law,43 
international political economy,44 and European Union studies,45 
among others, have suggested that we may be witnessing on the 
global scale, especially after the end of the Cold War, a return to 
political and legal patterns characteristic of medieval Europe. Some 
have advocated such changes, but of course only selectively and with 
much modification. We can certainly find intriguing analogies 
between contemporary developments and medieval history. But I 
think there is more to this. 
Those who invoke the analogy see the world, and Europe 
 
42. See, e.g., HEDLEY BULL, THE ANARCHICAL SOCIETY 245–46, 254–66 (2d. 
ed. 1995); Marek Cichocki, Nowe średniowiecze, 1(5) NOWA EUROPA 310, 310–29 
(2007).  
43. See, e.g., Paolo G. Carozza, My Friend Is a Stranger: The Death Penalty 
and the Global Ius Commune of Human Rights, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1031, 1036 
(2003).  
44. See, e.g., Stephen Kobrin, Back to the Future: Neomedievalism and the 
Postmodern Digital World Economy, 51 J. INT’L AFF. 361 (1998); Jörg Friedrichs, 
The Meaning of New Medievalism, 7 EUR. J. INT’L REL. 475 (2001).  
45. See, e.g., Peter Koslowski, Die Europäische Union und das Ende der 
Einheit von Staatsvolk und Staat (International Centre for Economic Research, 
Working Paper No. 11, 2004); Peter Koslowski, Unia Europejska a koniec jedności 
narodu i państwa, 1(5) NOWA EUROPA 273 (2007). 
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especially, as returning in some ways to the middle ages, to structures 
of rule more like medieval Europe, with its Church, Holy Roman 
Empire, universal values, and common law (Civil and Canon), but 
also with its fragmentation and complexity, kingdoms and 
principalities, cities and towns, leagues of cities and towns, law 
merchant, manorial law, and so on.46 
The locus classicus for the working out of this analogy in 
international relations is the work of Hedley Bull.47 In more recent 
political economy, the most substantial and interesting seems to me 
an article by Kobrin.48 In international law, we see it invoked, for 
example, by Carozza in his work on the law governing the death 
penalty.49 
What are we to make of this new medievalism? I think we should 
take it seriously. These are not simply intriguing analogies. What 
then? Are we in fact returning to the middle ages? Are we returning 
to the Holy Roman Empire? In some ways the answer is obvious: no. 
But I think there is a more interesting answer possible, identifying not 
just a trend but a project worthy of our support, which does not 
require us to go medieval but does indeed involve restoration of 
continuity with the age before the Treaties of Westphalia (to use 
those much abused treaties, once again, as a symbol).  
We return in fact to a very ancient project with its roots, we might 
say, in ancient Sumer, if not earlier. This is an effort to create a 
complex universal civilization, with the project of a global 
constitution as part of that larger project. So we can be seen as 
restoring continuity with the effort in medieval Europe, which was 
itself a restoration of continuity with the ancient effort, Roman in the 
Western tradition, of building a universal complex civilization, 
including its legal and political framework. And the analogies of new 
medievalism can be elaborated into a distinctly non-Kantian view of 
the project of global law, as part of a project of complex universal 
civilization, in which there is room for fragmentation and pluralism 
as well as universal principles and higher law. 
A number of theoretical historians now see the Roman Empire as 
 
46. See HAROLD BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION (1983); HENDRIK SPRUYT, 
THE SOVEREIGN STATE AND ITS COMPETITORS (1994).  
47. BULL, supra note 42.  
48. Kobrin, supra note 44.  
49. Carozza, supra note 43, at 1036. 
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just one among a number of such efforts rooted in what we might 
call, after Jaspers, the axial transformation.50 The earlier efforts to 
establish universal civilizations and Universal Empires were 
religiously based (the Han Empire based on Confucianism, Asoka’s 
empire based on Buddhism, the Islamic caliphate). And of course the 
medieval European such effort was also religiously based, and it was 
finally killed by religious divisions and religious wars. Those who 
speak of a new middle ages do not propose to give new global 
authority to the pope in Rome.51 But they both see trends and in some 
cases (indeed, in my case) support those trends toward a return to the 
project of a universal complex civilization, this time secular in form. 
If we are to return to this project, then global law and the law of the 
global constitution would be at its center. 
So what may seem to be simply an intriguing analogy or a way of 
using history to free our imaginations from the Westphalian prison 
can also be seen as more than that. It can be seen as an inkling of 
perhaps the largest of human creative projects, the project of building 
a universal complex civilization, proceeding over millennia in fits 
and starts in a pattern followed by all complex creation: a cycle that 
begins with the slow articulation of a creative project, its flourishing, 
crisis, and then renewal in modified form.  
This is the grand and encompassing project of human creative 
power guided by impartial principle and the many creative projects 
which are its expression, including the project of law and the project 
of moderation, with its most ambitious, cathedral-like goal of 
building a universal civilization. Such a civilization would contain a 
multiplicity of creative projects, each with some autonomy from the 
others but also connected to the others in various ways. Each 
individual life would count as a separate project, among others, 
individual and collective. 
These multiple projects would be cross-cutting and would generate 
cross-cutting and multiple loyalties, with a complex system of cross-
cutting boundaries and conflicting ends. Territorial states would be 
one type of project among many, one instrument through which 
 
50. KARL JASPERS, THE ORIGIN AND GOAL OF HISTORY (1953). For the more 
recent dramatic revival of the idea, see SHMUEL EISENSTADT, THE ORIGINS AND 
DIVERSITY OF AXIAL AGE CIVILIZATIONS (1986); AXIAL CIVILIZATIONS AND 
WORLD HISTORY (JOHANN ARNASON ET AL., EDS., 2005).  
51. See supra notes 47–50. 
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human creative power attempts to make the world better. But 
territorial states would lose their dominance. 
The political and legal foundation of such a civilization would look 
more like the European Union than anything else that now exists. A 
project needs exemplars (or paradigms), and the European Union can 
serve as its exemplar. An exemplar is not to be slavishly copied, and 
no one in his or her right mind would slavishly copy the EU. No, an 
exemplar is supposed to be an aid to creative power, to suggest new 
lines of development and new principles first only glimpsed through 
trial and error and the kind of blind incrementalism that has been for 
the most part the construction method of the EU. 
In many ways the European Union looks more like the Holy 
Roman Empire than like the modern nation state. So medieval and 
renaissance institutions, as well as medieval and renaissance ideas, 
are now again invoked as guides to our project of creation. 
Althusius,52 the great theorist of the Holy Roman Empire, as we 
might consider him, is now taken with new seriousness and used to 
do intellectual battle against both Hobbes53 and Kant.54 And 
Switzerland, which has preserved continuity with the Holy Roman 
Empire more than any other state,55 emerges as a constitutional model 
of consensual and consociational democracy in the influential work 
of Arend Lijphart.56 
By restoring continuity with the past we move forward in the 
project of universal civilization; we enact another stage in the 
sequence of renewals Peter Koslowski identifies as drivers of the 
European civilization.57 They are not exclusively European, however. 
Through a sequence of rebirths and renewals, a modern stage of the 
project of universal civilization is slowly articulated. So we do not 
return to the middle ages but move forward to the next stage of 
 
52. See JOHANNES ALTHUSIUS, POLITICA (Liberty Fund 1997) (1614). 
53. See THOMAS HUEGLIN, EARLY MODERN CONCEPTS FOR A LATE MODERN 
WORLD (1999).  
54. See JOHN KEANE, GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY 125 (2003) (―[A] theory of global 
civil society needs less Kant and more Althusius.‖).  
55. For a good discussion of the Swiss case, see JONATHAN STEINBERG, WHY 
SWITZERLAND? (1996).  
56. AREND LIJPHART, PATTERN OF DEMOCRACY (1999); AREND LIJPHART, 
THINKING ABOUT DEMOCRACY (2008). See Brendan O’Leary, Debating 
Consociational Politics: Normative and Explanatory Arguments, in FROM POWER 
SHARING TO DEMOCRACY 3 43 (Sid Noel ed., 2005).  
57. Koslowski, supra note 45.  
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modernity, slowly freeing ourselves from its Enlightenment-era 
constraints and distortions. And the new stage of modernity restores 
continuity with the project of building a polycentric universal 
civilization, which in Europe was itself an attempt to restore 
continuity with ancient Rome.  
I think this may be a good context, the largest context also, for 
considering the project of the global constitution and its law. 
VIII. GLOBAL CONSTITUTION 
If we are going to restore continuity with the medieval project, we 
should perhaps also try not to be imprisoned by the eighteenth 
century idea of what a constitution is. A constitution need not come 
in the format of a sovereign act by a sovereign people. We can learn 
much yet from the British constitution, which maintained continuity 
(and restored it after it was broken) with its own medieval projects of 
law.58 
The global constitution is a project, or better, multiple projects. It 
is the most ambitious and encompassing formulation of the project of 
law. A constitution as a project is not to be identified with the 
character of a political system or a structure of power, whatever it 
might be. Stalin’s Soviet Union was a political system with a 
distinctive set of characteristics (e.g., the leading role of the Marxist-
Leninist Party and state ownership of the means of production), but it 
had no constitution. Of course, the propaganda documents with the 
title Constitution of the USSR were not the constitution either.59 On 
 
58. John McEldowney writes of the United Kingdom’s constitution that 
―[c]ontinuity is seen as one of [its] self-perpetuating features . . . .‖ Memorandum 
by Professor John McEldowney, University of Warwick, para. 21 (Sept. 8, 2003) 
[hereinafter McEldowney Memorandum] available at http://www.parliament.the-
stationery-office.co.uk/pa/ld200203/ldselect/ldconst/168/16809.htm#note92 
(―address[ing] the [e]ffects of the proposed European Constitution on the 
constitution of the United Kingdom‖). And he continues:  
The absence of a single or codified constitution leaves the working out of 
the practicalities of the constitution to the system of laws, conventions and 
customs that are the hallmark of the medieval inheritance. A notable feature 
is the use of conventions . . . that comprise the common practices and 
workings of government that link the modern with the ancient, medieval 
constitution. 
Id. para. 2.3. 
59. They were mostly fiction and propaganda, with a few facts added. See 
generally THE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE USSR AND THE UNION REPUBLICS: 
ANALYSIS, TEXTS, REPORTS (F. J. M. Feldbrugge ed., 1979). 
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the other hand, Britain does have a constitution.60 And we can 
perfectly well understand the claim of the French Declaration of the 
Rights of Man and Citizen that without separation of powers there is 
no constitution.61 
What then is the project of constitution or, for that matter, what is a 
constitution? It is a project with an intimate connection to the project 
of law. So let me propose this: a structure of power has a constitution 
to the extent it is committed to the project of moderation, with some 
form of a plurality of impartial principles and some of those 
principles expressing in various ways opposition to the power and 
effect of human destructive capacity. The commitment can be 
expressed in legal form, in the form of a law of the constitution that 
has superior authority and that is hard to amend. But more deeply it 
must be a political commitment. 
Understood in this way, a constitution has a necessary connection 
to law and the project of law, but it has no necessary connection to 
the state. And when understood in this way the most ambitious form 
of constitution is a global constitution, a global commitment to the 
project of moderation.  
So what would a global constitution look like? It would not be an 
act of a ―We the People‖ but a realm of principle emerging in a 
sequence of creative acts on a path from a system of ―law made 
consensually between states.‖62 It would also not be a liberal project. 
It is a project, so it is not yet in existence. But it can be discovered 
in trends we can identify and in what appears just over the horizon. 
Since it is a project, it does not have a unique possible future. That 
future will emerge, if it emerges at all (being a project, it might not), 
out of a contest among various possible conceptions of that future. If 
 
60. See McEldowney Memorandum, supra note 58. For a classic source, see A. 
V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 
(1915). For a contemporary textbook, see COLIN TURPIN & ADAM TOMKINS, 
BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND THE CONSTITUTION (2007). 
61. Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen art. 16 (Fr. 1789) (―A society 
in which the observance of the law is not assured, nor the separation of powers 
defined, has no constitution at all.‖), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/do 
cid/3ae6b52410.html.  
62.  The University of Maryland School of Law—International & Comparative 
Law Symposium, Multilateralism and Global Law: Evolving Conceptions of 
International Law and Governance, http://www.law.umaryland.edu/faculty/confer 
ences/detail.html?conf=86 (last visited May 14, 2010) (description of conference). 
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a constitution is a commitment to moderation, then this project is one 
in which we develop the legal forms of a global commitment to 
moderation, those forms which are usable by the courts. 
Constitutionalization is a process in which we diminish the influence 
of human destructiveness and enhance the influence of impartial 
principles. It requires as such neither a state nor a demos.  
Let me present a sketch of moderate cosmopolitan 
constitutionalism and its conception of a global constitution by way 
of contrast with the closest available alternative, or at least the closest 
alternative I am familiar with, Mattias Kumm’s ―paradigm of 
cosmopolitan constitutionalism,‖ which he develops in opposition to 
what he calls the paradigm of statist constitutionalism.63  
Both paradigms are presented as accounts of law as it is (though in 
a Dworkinian spirit), and Kumm argues that the cosmopolitan 
paradigm is simply a better account, on the dimensions of both fit and 
value.64 He writes:  
Cosmopolitan constitutionalism does not just articulate an 
ideal. The argument here is a legal argument . . . . It is not a 
political program . . . . The correct paradigm is the one that 
best fits legal practice. All conceptual paradigms trying to 
reconstruct legal practice from an internal point of view 
necessarily have an idealizing element that complements the 
conventional element.65  
Kumm’s footnote here is to Dworkin’s Law’s Empire,66 and the 
reference is not to its last chapter, with its effort to articulate 
something closer to the project of law.67 
Cosmopolitan constitutionalism is a  
jurisprudential account claiming to describe the deep structure 
of public law as it is . . . [and whose] central claim is that a 
cosmopolitan paradigm is better able than a statist paradigm to 
make sense of contemporary public law practice, to provide a 
 
63. Kumm, supra note 19, at 258–324. 
64. Id. Interpretations must fit the legal facts, and justify them as much as 
possible, in accordance with what is also known as the principle of charity in 
interpretation. The slogan is: ―make it the best it can be.‖  
65. Id. at 311.  
66. Id. at 311 n.106.  
67. DWORKIN, supra note 6, at 400–13.  
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plausible reconstructive account that both fits that practice and 
shows it in the best light.68  
Kumm summarizes the contrast between the two paradigms most 
succinctly when he writes: 
Instead of ―We the People,‖ statehood and sovereignty as the 
foundations of a practice of constitutional law that imagines 
itself as focused on the interpretation of one text, diverse legal 
materials are identified, structured and interpreted in light of 
principles that lie at the heart of the modern tradition of 
constitutionalism. Ultimate authority is vested not in ―We, the 
People‖ either nationally or globally, but in the principles of 
constitutionalism.69 
These central principles of constitutionalism for Kumm are: the 
principle of legality, the jurisdictional principles of subsidiarity, the 
principle of due process, and the principle of human rights and 
reasonableness.70  
When Kumm elaborates the last of these principles, he provides us 
with another succinct formulation of the contrast between his two 
paradigms: ―Within the statist paradigm . . . constitutional rights are 
rights whose authority is traced back to the will of the national 
constitutional legislator . . . . The cosmopolitan conception, on the 
other hand, takes as basic a commitment to rights-based public 
reason . . . .‖71 
Since my aim is to articulate an alternative form of cosmopolitan 
constitutionalism, let me call Kumm’s version ―rights based‖ and 
contrast it with a ―moderate‖ alternative, which is also concerned 
with contributing to the project of human creative power and not 
simply to a codification of existing legal practice from the internal 
point of view. 
If we see law, particularly constitutional law, as a project, we will 
be less concerned than Kumm with the question whether the statist or 
the cosmopolitan paradigm provides the best fit to legal practice. Law 
is now, as always, in transition. The best fit to legal practice would be 
obtained if we admit as much. For the purposes of the project of 
 
68. Kumm, supra note 19, at 262.  
69. Id. at 271–72. 
70. Id. at 277.  
71. Id. at 304–05. 
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cosmopolitan constitutionalism, current practice can be best 
accounted for as part of a transition from the statist to a cosmopolitan 
paradigm, inevitably containing elements of both. And our task is to 
articulate the cosmopolitan paradigm not as an account of the deep 
structure of law as it is and not simply as a political ideal, but as a 
project of law, integrated with a larger political ideal and with larger, 
moderate, political institutional complexes and moderate political 
practice. 
The moderate conception of cosmopolitan constitutionalism can be 
best presented when we reformulate slightly Kumm’s contrast. The 
moderate cosmopolitan constitutionalism is best contrasted with an 
eighteenth century paradigm, in which the core moderate 
commitments of constitutionalism are constrained and distorted in at 
least three ways: by the Westphalian and statist constraints to be sure, 
but also by the distinctive context of eighteenth century revolutions 
(in the name of ―We the People‖), and by a one-sided preoccupation 
with rights, a preoccupation backed by social contract theory. The 
eighteenth century framework is statist, revolutionary, and rights-
centered.  
The moderate cosmopolitan alternative preserves and modifies the 
sovereign territorial states, subjecting them more thoroughly to 
universal principle. It preserves and modifies the revolutionary 
tradition, eliminating the (Cartesian?) idea of a grand moment of 
creation by the People ex nihilo, and restoring the old idea of a 
revolution as renewal and rebirth. And finally, it preserves and 
modifies the commitment to universal human rights by combining it 
with universal human responsibilities. In all three dimensions (and 
we could add more) the contrast is between an eighteenth century 
paradigm of constitutionalism (or an Enlightenment paradigm, if you 
prefer) and a moderate cosmopolitan paradigm, designed for the next 
stage of the modern transformation (the post-Enlightenment stage). 
This moderate cosmopolitan alternative is addressed not just to 
courts (though it certainly needs to be addressed to courts) but to 
multiple institutional audiences, notably to an emerging self-limiting 
global social movement, which needs to be part of this project, if the 
project is to move forward. The fundamental principles of this project 
must be fundamental principles of the project of moderation in its 
current stage, not simply principles of constitutionalism. They must 
be capable of formulation in a manner that appeals to courts, and 
SOLTAN (DO NOT DELETE) 5/27/2010  2:56 PM 
2010] LAW, MODERATION, AND THE GLOBAL CONSTITUTION 257 
hence to lawyers, but also to a broad civic movement. 
A moderate alternative, addressed in this way to both courts and 
the people organized in self-limiting social movements might build a 
global constitution around five principles: (1) the principle of 
universal human rights, codified into a distinctive, moderate, 
conception of global justice, which incorporates a commitment to 
democracy and to due process; (2) the principle of universal human 
responsibility; (3) the principle of unity in diversity, as an expression 
of the moderate commitment to pluralism; (4) the principle of 
subsidiarity, as a reflection of both the principle of equal human 
dignity and the commitment to pluralism; and (5) the principle of the 
effective pursuit of the goals of humanity. 
We could see this constitution as establishing a union of semi-
autonomous and cross-cutting republics of a new kind (more on this 
below), subject to universal principles: a principle of universal human 
rights which we can codify into an account of global justice and a 
principle of universal human responsibility. 
Global justice would not build on the contractarian idea 
(elaborated by Rawls, but with roots in the social contract theories of 
the Enlightenment) of fair terms of social cooperation among free and 
equal citizens. It builds instead on an idea that emerges from the hard 
experience of the twentieth century: the equal inviolability of human 
dignity.72 Fair terms of social cooperation leave us cold. But when the 
German nation commits itself for eternity to the proposition that 
human dignity is inviolable,73 we are moved to tears. 
IX. A UNION OF REPUBLICS 
Consider first the components of a global constitution designed for 
a complex universal civilization. I have called them republics. These 
republics are not (necessarily) states. They are bounded domains 
within which distinctive impartial principles, distinctive public ends 
and purposes, and distinctive interpretations of universal principles 
can be articulated. In the Westphalian system, it was natural to think 
only of territorial states as republics. But even in the Westphalian 
 
72. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, pmbl., U.N. Doc. 
A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948), available at http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/index.s 
html.  
73. GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [Constitution] art. 1(1) (F.R.G.) (―Human dignity is 
inviolable. To respect and protect it shall be the duty of all state authority.‖). 
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system it would have been good to think of corporations as potential 
republics as well.  
In fact, if we allow for incomplete autonomy, we can see a great 
multitude of republics-in-the making across the world. And what we 
need as part of this project of global constitution, which is a form of 
the project of globalization, is not the elimination of boundaries. If 
anything, we need additional boundaries to create and sustain the 
autonomy, which the multiple inchoate republics need in order to 
develop. We need boundaries of different types. Some are territorial 
boundaries, corresponding to contemporary territorial states, regional 
―unidentified political objects‖ (such as the European Union), 
provinces and localities within states, or regions across boundaries of 
states (as these are defined in EU, for example). Some are boundaries 
between groups of people (say those who speak French, those who 
speak Flemish, and those who speak German, if you are in Belgium). 
And some are boundaries between issue areas, distinguishing what 
we have come to call regimes (a trade regime, a health care regime, a 
climate regime, and so on).  
In a system of multiple and cross-cutting republics, there will be 
multiple and cross-cutting boundaries. A complex civilization 
requires such a system; it requires a fragmented law. But as we 
constitutionalize a union of republics, these boundaries will cease to 
be (over time) set by the balance of military force in past wars, or 
dynastic arrangements in a long forgotten past, or past calculations of 
how to establish stable peace. They will be less arbitrary and less 
preoccupied with the power of human destructiveness. They will be 
more principled than the territorial boundaries we inherit. They will 
also be less vague than the regime and sub-regime boundaries we 
inherit. The problem of fragmentation in international law is not so 
much a problem of fragmentation itself (after all, federal systems are 
also systems of fragmented law). It is rather a problem of the absence 
of well defined and principled boundaries, separating what ought to 
be the semi-autonomous legal systems, or what I have called the 
semi-autonomous republics. 
Not any boundary will do. It should be precise enough to allow 
within-republic consistency. It should be flexible enough to allow 
easy change as the situation changes. The principle of flexibility is 
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important in the European Union. Schengen,74 the Euro zone,75 and 
the multiple other derogations and exceptions in effect create many 
different kinds of boundaries within the EU. The boundary’s location 
should be determined by impartial principle. Boundary setting by 
referenda is a good case in point, best exemplified by the 
establishment of the Swiss Canton Jura,76 and less well exemplified 
by various boundary setting referenda in the immediate aftermath of 
World War I. Finally, this system of overlapping republics should 
have boundaries which are limited by principles determining who can 
cross, what goods can cross, which legal cases can cross, and so on.  
The project will thus preserve and enhance complexity and hence 
boundaries. But not arbitrary boundaries. They will be set in 
principled ways. Their power as boundaries will be limited by 
principle, and they will be flexible. Vague inter-regime boundaries 
will be made more precise, as is being done all the time, perhaps 
most explicitly by various courts and court-like institutions. There is 
nothing incoherent about complexity and fragmentation if the 
boundaries are not vague and if unifying principles exist. 
This union of semi-autonomous and cross-cutting republics in the 
slowly emerging global constitution enacts the principle of unity in 
diversity. The diversity is protected by the principle of subsidiarity. 
The unity is provided by two universal substantive principles. A 
principle of universal human rights has been a visible part of the 
emerging global constitution for some time. If we are to formulate 
this constitution in a way usable by social movements as well as 
courts, we can plausibly now attempt to articulate it more fully into a 
conception of justice based on human dignity, in a format that lends 
itself to comparison with, say, Rawls’s conception of justice (or other 
philosophical conceptions).77 
The basic principle of global justice that might emerge from a 
codification of the emerging human rights practice would be nothing 
like Rawls’ fair terms of social cooperation among free and equal 
citizens. Human dignity would necessarily be the featured idea, so we 
 
74. See generally Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement, June 14, 
1985, 30 I.L.M. 73. 
75. See CHRISTIAN N. CHABOT, UNDERSTANDING THE EURO: THE CLEAR AND 
CONCISE GUIDE TO THE NEW TRANS-EUROPEAN ECONOMY 25, 175–76 (1999). 
76. STEINBERG, supra note 55. 
77. See RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 7; MARTHA NUSSBAUM, 
FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE (2006).  
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might suggest a principle of the equal inviolability of human dignity 
(or more simply, in the German manner: human dignity is inviolable). 
Most philosophical theories of justice, not just Rawls, simply 
marginalize human dignity.78 Those that do not (such as Nussbaum) 
identify the dimensions of human dignity in a manner that bears no 
relation to the emerging practice of human rights. On various 
occasions, Nussbaum has listed ten conditions (not always the same 
ten) necessary for a life worthy of human dignity.79 Her lists are not 
supported by legal practice, nor could they be.  
But a different set of dimensions of human dignity does emerge 
from legal practice. It arguably constitutes that ideal of global justice 
which is part of the project of the global constitution. 
Clapham, drawing on legal sources, has identified at least four 
aspects of the concern for dignity:  
(1) the prohibition of all types of inhuman treatment, 
humiliation, or degradation; (2) the assurance of possibility for 
individual choice and the conditions for each individual’s self-
fulfillment, autonomy, and self-realization; (3) the recognition 
that the protection of group identity and culture may be 
essential for the protection of personal dignity; and (4) the 
creation of necessary conditions for each individual to have 
their essential needs satisfied.80 
So we have four dimensions of human dignity: a prohibition of 
degrading and cruel treatment; a requirement of equal respect, 
demanding individual liberties and civil and political rights; 
protection of what gives human lives meaning and purpose (religion 
and nation, for example); and an economic and social guarantee. 
Each of these dimensions of human dignity is capable of a distinct 
articulation, codification, and formalization. Each deserves its own 
distinct limitation clause. The priority among the dimensions can be 
expressed through these limitations clauses, avoiding the awkward 
choice between two seemingly unacceptable alternatives: no 
 
78. Among those who marginalize human dignity, one can cite all the main 
representatives of the contemporary contractarian tradition, John Rawls prominent 
among them, and all the main representatives of the Lockean traditions, such as 
Robert Nozick. See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974).  
79. NUSSBAUM, supra note 77, at 76–78.  
80. ANDREW CLAPHAM, HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS OF NON-STATE ACTORS 
545–46 (2006). 
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priorities at all or lexical priority of the kind Rawls proposes. 
This ideal of justice is in no way contractarian. The core idea is the 
inviolability of human dignity. And this core idea is elaborated not by 
considering in more detail the meaning of human dignity in general 
and the history of the concept’s use.81 Nor is it elaborated, as in 
Nussbaum’s theory, by some independent consideration of what is 
necessary for a life worthy of human dignity.82 There is a real project 
of human rights in place; its elaboration proceeds through legal and 
political deliberation and struggle. The theoretical task is to expand 
on the articulation and codification that are occurring as part of this 
deliberation and struggle. The work of lawyers and political 
movements seems here more significant than the work of 
philosophers. 
Rawls’s theory of justice83 and Dworkin’s theory of equal concern 
and respect84 recognize only two of these four dimensions. They have 
no room for the distinctive treatment of cruel and degrading treatment 
or hence for the distinctive evil of torture and genocide. They also 
have no room for the protection of what gives human life meaning 
and of groups that are carriers of what gives life meaning: cultures, 
religions and national traditions. Arguably, the recognition of the four 
dimensions, rather than the two in Rawls and Dworkin, marks our 
moderate conception as more inclusive than the mainstream liberal 
theory of justice. The contrast with mainstream liberalism goes 
further. 
A moderate conception of the global constitution can be 
uncompromising in its commitment to universal human rights and an 
ideal of global justice that codifies human rights. But it can also be 
equally uncompromising in its commitment to universal human 
responsibility. Liberal conceptions are likely to be reticent on this 
second front. To the extent this is true, liberal conceptions of global 
constitution are bound to be unbalanced and incomplete. The 
principle of universal human responsibility, I would argue, is just 
emerging on the global horizon, mostly in the rather specialized 
context of environmental concerns, with nothing like the history of 
 
81. See Jeremy Waldron, Dignity, Rank, and Rights, Tanner Lectures, 
University of California at Berkeley (Apr. 21, 2009).  
82. See generally NUSSBAUM, supra note 77. 
83. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 7. 
84. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 272–73 (1977). 
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the principle of universal human rights and hence without the 
elaboration, codification, and legal standing. 
It emerges as such in the Earth Charter,85 where the distinctive 
concern is with sustainability and protecting the ecological integrity 
of the Earth. Or we can use the principle of ―common but 
differentiated responsibility‖86 taken from the climate regime (and 
applied there to states), but which can be reformulated more broadly. 
The Earth Charter is a declaration first suggested in the Brundlandt 
Report’s call for a ―universal declaration‖ and a ―new charter.‖87 The 
1992 Earth Summit in Rio failed to agree on any such charter, so it 
became an initiative of what we like to call the global civil society, 
developed under the leadership of Maurice Strong and Mikhail 
Gorbachev. No other document has generated so much support from 
below across the globe. But it has limited support from states; it is not 
even soft law. 
Law, however, can emerge also from human interaction,88 and 
from below. If law is a project, and global law its most ambitious 
formulation, then the principles of the Earth Charter may tell us 
something about where this project is aiming. 
We must join together,‖ the Earth Charter proclaims in its 
Preamble,  
to bring forth a sustainable global society founded on respect 
for nature, universal human rights, economic justice an a 
culture of peace. . . . To realize these aspirations, we must 
decide to live with the sense of universal responsibility, 
identifying ourselves with the whole Earth community, as well 
as our local communities. We are at once citizens of different 
nations and of one world . . . .89 
 
85. The Earth Charter Initiative, The Earth Charter, 
http://www.earthcharterinaction.org/invent/images/uploads/echarter_english.pdf 
(last visited Apr. 7, 2010) [hereinafter Earth Charter]. 
86. U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, June 14, 1992, Rio 
Declaration on Environment and Development princ. 7, U.N. Doc. A/ 
CONF.151/5/Rev.1 (―In view of the different contributions to global environmental 
degradation, States have common but differentiated responsibilities . . . .‖). 
87. See KLAUS BOSSELMAN, THE PRINCIPLE OF SUSTAINABILITY 2 (2008). 
88. See Lon Fuller, Human Interaction and the Law, in THE PRINCIPLES OF 
SOCIAL ORDER: SELECTED ESSAYS OF LON FULLER (Kenneth Winston ed., 1981). 
89. Earth Charter, supra note 85, pmbl. 
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One way to understand the Earth Charter is to see it, with Klaus 
Bosselman, as articulating above all a principle of sustainability.90 
But there is another way, which connects environmental concerns 
that inevitably dominate the principle of sustainability with a broader 
ethic of responsibility: we are citizens of one world. 
So one can perhaps say this: the principle of universal human 
rights expresses the conception of justice contained in the global 
constitution. The principle of universal human responsibility 
expresses a conception of a civic ideal contained in the global 
constitution, as it is now emerging just over the horizon of law. 
X. CONCLUSION 
The dominance of the West may be one reason why our 
articulation of the global constitution is unbalanced in favor of human 
rights. Other civilizations (the Confucian tradition comes to mind) 
have preserved more fully a concern with responsibilities. The project 
of law, according to the moderate conception, culminates in a 
moderate global constitution—not anti-liberal, but not simply liberal 
either. 
It will be91, it ought to be, a constitution that balances rights and 
responsibilities, and one that anticipates the renewal of non-western 
civilizations, such as the Confucian one. In its rights-based 
conception of global justice it will recognize at least four dimensions 
of human dignity, and hence also—perhaps especially—the 
significance of what gives meaning to human lives. It will support 
and express the complexity of a universal civilization, itself unique, 
but also protecting and enhancing the uniqueness of its component 
parts. It will be a constitution whose principles reflect an engagement 
in the struggle against the power and effect of human destructiveness. 
And, finally, it will be a constitution, whose principles are formulated 
as law, for the use of courts, but also as principles for the guidance of 




90. See generally BOSSELMAN, supra note 87. 
91. This is not a prediction of the future (see the first paragraph of this paper). It 
is an effort to articulate a moderate form of the project of a global constitution. 
